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Abstract
Rapid digitalisation of payments leads to greater cost and time efficiency, yet could
also potentially trigger legal and security challenges as well as lead to weakening of finan-
cial stability and less effective monetary policy transmission. In order to ensure greater
safety, central banks are contemplating and testing solutions thanks to which public using
payment innovations could transact in funds that are ultimately backed by central bank.
One of these solutions is central bank digital currency, a digital version of cash. The pro-
posed versions of central bank digital currency are very diverse. Depending on the version
assumed by a particular central bank, central bank digital currency can have an impact
on central bank interest rate setting, monetary policy implementation and transmission
mechanism. This relates most notably to effective lower bound which could either rise or
fall, conditional on design on central bank digital currently.
JEL codes: E42, E52, E58, G21, G28.
Keywords: virtual currencies, central bank digital currency, monetary pol-
icy, effective lower bound
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen an acceleration in payment innovations. The innovations have been
concentrated in facilities using private money denominated in currencies backed by the central
banks, and virtual currencies, or rather cryptoassets, which are not backed by any entities (ECB
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2019). The latter had the advantage of the technilogical innovation (distributed ledger tech-
nology, including Blockchain), yet the drawback of heightened volatility. This has prompted
development of stablecoins, pegged to one or several global currencies or to a valuable asset
(BIS 2019). Stablecoins, however, share the challenges with virtual currencies, such as over-
sight, legal and security risks, as well as impairment of monetary policy transmission mechanism
which could resemble dollarisation of the economy, ﬁnancial stability threats related to currency
and duration mismatch in households’ and corporates’ balance sheets and disintermediation of
banks. On the top of that, stablecoins, particularly of global reach, could lead to heightened
volatility in international ﬁnancial markets as well as to a fall of supply in high-quality liquid
assets globally which could make meeting the Basel III standards harder for commercial banks
(BIS 2019). Most importantly, however, growing popularity of the stablecoins could challenge
the appropriateness of current payment system solutions.
In order to ensure greater payment safety and ﬁnancial system stability, some central banks
considered providing the individuals with solutions that would allow them to transact with
funds that are ultimately backed by the central bank (BIS 2018, Adrian and Mancini-Griﬀoli
2019). Hence, in mid-2010s, they started to contemplate the concept of issuing their own
digital currency, a digital version of cash (Barrdear and Kumhof 2016).
The concept is quite fresh and unstructured, which is reﬂected in the variety of designs
proposed by individual central banks. However, three features of CBDC stand out. It would
be a legal tender, available solely in a digital form and issued by the central bank. Most
proposals suggest that the amount of CBDC would be very limited, at least in the beginning
(Barrdear and Kumhof 2016, BIS 2018, ECB 2019). However, the case when cash is eliminated
completely, leaving CBDC the only central bank currency in place, is also subject to research
(Borio and Levin 2017, Davoodalhosseini 2018).
The paper aims to provide an overview of still quite scarce literature on CBDC, and more
speciﬁcally, on monetary policy-related problems. It discusses hypothetical challenges stem-
ming from the appearance of CBDC for monetary policy strategy, implementation as well as
the impact on the broader economy. Since, for the time being, the discussion on CBDC is dom-
inated by central banks from advanced economies, the paper highlights some emerging-market
economy perspectives, currently almost non-existent in literature.
This remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of
the current state of work on CBDC in central banks, as well as the design options for the
CBDC. Section 3 assesses the impact of the emergence of CBDC on monetary policy strategy
and implementation, depending on the design option chosen. Section 4 discusses the inﬂuence
of CBDC on monetary policy transmission mechanism as well as the economy. Section 5
concludes.
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2 State of work on central bank digital currencies and
their design
In line with a BIS survey (conducted in late 2018 among central banks of countries constituting
together 90 per cent of global GDP), around 70 per cent of central banks are currently studying
the concept of CBDC, and the share of these banks is increasing. However, only 15 per cent
seriously consider issuing any form of CBDC over in the coming years; 75 per cent of central
banks might not be in position to issue CBDC due to legal constraints (Barontini and Holden
2019).
The scope of studies on CBDC is in most cases purely hypothetical (Mancini-Griﬀoli 2018,
BIS 2018), with slightly more than 60 per cent of central banks currently being at the research
phase. Around 30 per cent of them are already experimenting, and around 10 per cent have
launched pilot projects (Barontini and Holden 2019). The most recent example is the People’s
Bank of China that said it was almost ready to launch its own CBDC. CBDC for wholesale
purposes are being developed in Canada or Singapore (Bank of Canada 2018, Monetary Au-
thority of Singapore 2017). At the same time, according to the BIS survey, almost 90 per cent
of central banks are contemplating oﬀering CBDC to the general public as the ultimate target
of their respective projects.
Most central banks cite providing safe and/or eﬃcient payment system as their main mo-
tivation behind launching CBDC projects. This motivation clearly stands out in individual
reports issued by central banks being at an advanced stage of research on CBDC (Sveriges
Riksbank 2017, Sveriges Riksbank 2018, Norges Bank 2018).
The need for CBDC in advanced economies does not seem particularly urgent. Cash remains
popular means of payment, and supervision framework is strong, also with respect to digital
payments, facilitated by the central bank (ECB 2019, Danmarks Nationalbank 2017). However,
as Lowe (2017) points out, in less developed emerging market countries, due to a lack of
suﬃcient infrastructure in the ﬁrst place, innovative payment solutions, developed beyond the
central banks supervision, can play a predominant role in payment services. In eﬀect, they
might cause distortions in ﬁnancial system, monetary policy implementation and interest rate
transmission mechanism, which is reﬂected in compelling motivations related to these areas in
these economies. In addition, emerging market economies mention the reduction in the size of
the shadow economy as another important motivation behind the work on CBDC (Barontini
and Holden 2019).
Judging from the available literature, the idea of what CBDC should be diﬀers very much
across central banks. In line with i.a. BIS (2018), Mancini-Griﬀoli (2018), Norges Bank
(2018) and Sveriges Riksbank (2018), the division lines concern, but are not constrained to,
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the following criteria: (i) accessibility (only for ﬁnancial institutions or for the general public),
(ii) technology (account-based or value/token-based), (iii) remuneration (interest-bearing or
not).
The stage of development of a version of CBDC that is accessible only to ﬁnancial insti-
tutions, also called a wholesale CBDC, is quite advanced in a number of economies. Such a
version of CBDC is simply a technological advancement. Within such a framework, monetary
policy strategy and implementation would be unchanged if central banks stopped at this stage.
Yet, as highlighted above, most central banks assume that CBDC will eventually be available
to the general public. In such a case, the central bank would be simply another commercial
bank (Lowe 2017, Danmarks Nationalbank 2017), with a great market power, which might
potentially lead to a conﬂict of interests between monetary policy or ﬁnancial stability and
commercial activity. If corporations are also allowed to set up an account with the central
bank, this idea would resemble an ineﬃcient monobank system in communist Central and
Eastern European economies before 1990 (Racocha 2004, Rod 2014, Szpunar 2018), even if
in a very narrow form, restricted to deposits. Meanwhile, commercial banks have a greater
expertise in oﬀering deposits as well as risk management practices related to these services
(Norges Bank 2018).
Such reservations are particularly valid in case when the CBDC’s design were account-
or registered-based, with accounts held by individuals at the central bank, as suggested by
Sveriges Riksbank (2017, 2018). In line with Norges Bank (2018), Sveriges Riksbank (2017)
and BIS (2018), in an account-based system, ﬁnancial assets would be kept in a centralised
system, preferably at the central bank or within a system controlled directly or indirectly by
the central bank. The consequence is that any transactions by individuals cause a change in
the central bank balance sheet, and, hence, the need for adjustment, thus complicating the
central banks balance sheet management policy.
The alternative to the account-based system is a value- or token-based system (Sveriges
Riksbank 2017, Lowe 2017). Within this system, the public would have an access to CBDC
through payment instruments, not accounts. The most commonly cited solution is that the
user might for instance draw on a commercial bank deposit with an app, which resembles the
conventional solutions already in place. According to Norges Bank (2018), with such a system,
there should be hardly any changes in monetary policy, as the central bank balance sheet would
not be directly aﬀected. This system is also labelled as a “two-tier” CBDC because CBDC
would still be channelled to the public through the ﬁnancial sector. Currently, the central
banks that are contemplating the introduction of their own digital currencies are increasingly
inclined towards value-based CBDC.
However, the most important distinction regarding CBDC with respect to monetary policy-
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related issues is the question of whether the account-based CBDC would be remunerated or
not. The answer to that would determine the impact of its introduction on the eﬀective lower
bound, and, indirectly, the level of the inﬂation target, as discussed in the following section.
3 Impact on monetary policy strategy and implementa-
tion
The sole introduction of CBDC would have an impact on the overall conditions in which
monetary policy is carried out, even if, over longer run, central banks should ensure that
CBDC, like cash now, is a neutral, autonomous factor for monetary policy.
In line with the literature consensus, the largest impact on monetary policy would be for
the account-based CBDC available to the general public. This is because, as discussed above,
value-based systems and solutions restricting CBDC provision to commercial banks would be
rather a technological change within the current payment system. Meanwhile, with an account-
based system, CBDC would have to set conditions under which it would run the accounts for
the general public, competing with the ones oﬀered by commercial banks.
The discussion in literature is centred around the impact of CBDCs introduction on the
eﬀective lower bound, which would be very diﬀerent, depending on the remuneration of CBDC
accounts.
If CBDC accounts were non-interest bearing, then, as long as the policy rates were signif-
icantly above zero, CBDC would simply be an autonomous factor for monetary policy. The
situation would change once the central bank tried to cut interest rates below zero, and com-
mercial banks tried to pass it on to deponents. Since the cost of holding CBDC is close to zero,
the deposit holders would most probably switch to CBDC accounts with the central bank.
The situation would hence be diﬀerent from now when, due to costs associated with holding
cash, slightly negative interest rates are possible. This means that the introduction of non-
interest bearing CBDC leads to higher eﬀective lower bound, thereby narrowing the room for
manoeuvre for monetary policy. This conclusion is an adaptation of a liquidity trap concept,
as drafted by Keynes (1934).
A rise of the eﬀective lower bound to zero has further important implications not only
for interest rate setting itself, but also for monetary policy communication. As Norges Bank
(2018) points out, the ability of central bank to inﬂuence expectations, for instance with forward
guidance, would be weaker than it is now.
If CBDC accounts were remunerated, the CBDC rate would constitute the ﬂoor for the
policy rates. With cash still in place, the eﬀective lower bound would be largely unchanged.
It would still be the yield on cash, i.e. slightly below zero (Barrdear and Kumhof 2016). As
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the role of cash diminishes, the eﬀective lower bound might even fall, since it would be easier
for the central bank to impact interest rates in the economy with CBDC interest rate setting,
thereby increasing the monetary policy space (Sveriges Riksbank 2018). Eﬀective lower bound
might be even eliminated along with cash, which, by allowing unrestricted monetary policy
space, could prompt central banks to lower their inﬂation targets (Bordo and Levin 2017).
Although the view is not consistent with the literature consensus, it seems that for value-
based CBDC, the eﬀective lower bound would also be impacted. The scale and direction,
however, would vary with time. Initially, due to a technological change in place, CBDC might
be costly to hold and transact in, therefore the eﬀective lower bound could even fall. However,
as the technology becomes cheaper and more widespread, the eﬀective lower bound could rise.
Since it is assumed that value-based CBDC would be non-interest rate bearing, the eﬀective
lower bound might even approach zero over longer run, and so be higher than now.
As long as cash is in circulation, a rise in popularity of CBDC could actually be conducive
narrower policy space (Norges Bank 2018). This is because of a pick-up in risk premia stemming
from higher ﬁnancial stability risks (Danmarks Nationalbank 2017). In addition, the reduction
in deposits held with commercial banks could lead to a rise in wholesale funding and collateral-
based central bank funding, and hence higher interest rates in interbank market and risk
premia, respectively (Mancini-Griﬀoli et al. 2018).
The literature also oﬀers considerations on further monetary policy instruments that arise
from the emergence of CBDC.
The ﬁrst proposal concerns the spread between the CBDC rate and the central bank ref-
erence rate. According to Norges Bank (2018), in normal times, this spread should be kept
unchanged and be suﬃciently large to for instance to insulate demand for CBDC from interest
rate decisions, and hence neutral character of the digital version of cash. Yet, the spread might
be narrowed in extraordinary circumstances, such as a rapid rise in demand for cash.
The second suggestion is imposing restrictions on access to CBDC, mainly to avoid pur-
chasing for this currency for speculation motives. However, as Sveriges Riksbank (2018) ar-
gues, restrictions could cause lower eﬃciency of payment systems. More importantly, it would
be hard to maintain parity with cash under such circumstances. Hence, Sveriges Riksbank
considers imposing fees on CBDC as an alternative to volume restrictions. This concept is
not new. Agarwal and Kimball (2015) proposed abandoning parity between cash and digital
form of currency and introducing, conversely, a time-varying paper currency deposit fee which
would allow to reduce the eﬀective lower bound. Time-varying relation between CBDC and
cash could be hence another monetary policy option, yet it might raise credibility issues and
practical problems, such as parallel exchange rates.
The available literature suggests that the introduction of CBDC might impact monetary
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policy transmission mechanism only if CBDC is interest-bearing (BIS 2018). In the opposite
case, the transmission mechanism is aﬀected only if the interest rates are close to zero (Sveriges
Riksbank 2018).
The interest-rate channel would be most aﬀected, since the level of the CBDC rate would
inﬂuence deposit rates in commercial banks more directly than currently. The inﬂuence on
bank lending rates, and lending channel in general, is less obvious, and would depend on the
source of external funding chosen by the banks in place of deposits declining due to outﬂow of
funds to the central bank. If commercial banks resort to central bank funding, the transmission
of central bank rates to lending rates could be stronger. However, if banks prefer interbank
funding, the central bank might not be able to inﬂuence lending rates to the extent it does
now (Mancini-Griﬀoli 2018, Sveriges Riksbank 2018, Norges Bank 2018). Yet, it should be
kept in mind that the outﬂow of deposits from commercial banks and the associated need
to provide external funding from diﬀerent sources do imply ﬁnancial stability challenges, with
potential implications to eﬃciency of monetary transmission mechanism as a whole (Danmarks
Nationalbank 2017).
The exchange rate channel of monetary policy transmission mechanism would be aﬀected
only if non-residents were allowed to use CBDC, and decided to do so for speculative purposes.
The problem would not, however, be restricted only to a limited number of advanced economies
during ﬂight to safety episodes. Conversely, it could be an issue for emerging market central
banks most of the time, due to a probable large swings in ﬂows into and out of CBDC,
depending on risk appetite, such as it is the case currently for other emerging market assets
(BIS 2018).
The literature on the impact of CBDC’s introduction on real economy and inﬂation is, for
the time being, scarce, heterogenic and inconclusive. This is because the topic is relatively new,
and, as discussed above, the construction of CBDC has not crystallised yet. Consequently, the
models used in the available papers are built on diﬀerent concepts of CBDC, which makes
them hardly comparable.
The most comprehensive papers on the subject (Barrdear and Kumhof 2016, Davoodalhos-
seini 2018) base on DSGE models, albeit with diﬀerent assumptions. Barrdear and Kumhof
(2018) consider the case when (account-based and interest-bearing) CBDC initially constitutes
around 30 per cent of GDP, and cash is still in use. Davoodalhosseini (2018), in turn, elabo-
rates on three diﬀerent major (and a number of minor) scenarios, with only cash in place, with
only CBDC in place, and with both cash and CBDC. The latter paper considers in addition
diﬀerent forms of CBDC, with a particular focus on remunerated form of this instrument.
Davoodalhosseini (2018) ﬁnds that the introduction of CBDC could lead to welfare gains,
yet only if the cash is entirely eliminated. The rise in consumption due to CBDC being the
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only legal tender in the United States is estimated to reach 1.6 per cent. With both cash and
CBDC available to the general public, monetary policy is found to be more constrained (due
to a presence of the eﬀective lower bound), yielding higher inﬂation and lower welfare. Results
improve if CBDC is interest-bearing, yet, still, the welfare is lower and inﬂation is higher than
in cases with just one legal tender in place.
According to Barrdear and Kumhof (2016), in turn, the introduction of CBDC could lead
to higher output (but also inﬂation), also if cash is still in use. The positive impact would result
from a fall in real interest rates and transaction costs. These results are only partly reﬂected in
more comprehensive reports issued by central banks. As Sveriges Riksbank (2018) points out,
CBDC could reduce transaction costs and thereby lead to marginally higher output, however,
it would be counterweighted by ﬁnancial stability concerns due to outﬂows from commercial
banks to CBDC. The fall in real interest rates produced by model proposed by Barrdear and
Kumhof (2016) could result simply from a rise in inﬂation.
4 Conclusions
From the above considerations, one can conclude that the introduction of CBDC would most
probably have an impact on monetary policy implementation, transmission mechanism, and,
in extreme cases, even the monetary policy strategy. However, the scale of these eﬀects would
depend on demand for this new form of money, as well as design. The bulk of the impact
on wider economy would come through the interest rate channel, most notably deposit rates.
With interest-bearing CBDC, the eﬀective lower bound below zero could be preserved, or,
even lowered, depending of the degree of popularity of this digital currency. The impact of
CBDC on broader economywould be rather mixed. On the one hand, it should lead to lower
transaction costs, which is conducive to higher output and welfare (but also inﬂation). Lower
interest rates would work in the same direction, yet it is not obvious that introduction of CBDC
would have a net dampening eﬀect on them. On the other hand, there are substantial ﬁnancial
system stability risks, associated most notably with the account-based CBDC, stemming from
an outﬂow of deposits to the central bank.
The research on CBDC and its impact on monetary policy is still ongoing. Although
this innovation has been researched from the angle of challenges for the domestic economy, the
international aspects of CBDC are still relatively underinvestigated, and require more thorough
insight.
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